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Abstract—This article investigates the anti-jamming commu-
nications problem in wireless networks from a Stackelberg
game perspective. By exploring and analyzing the inherent
characteristics of the anti-jamming problem, we present and
discuss some technical challenges and fundamental requirements
to address them. To be specific, the adversarial characteristic,
incomplete information constraints, dynamics, uncertainty, dense
deployment, and heterogeneous feature bring technical challenges
to anti-jamming communications in wireless networks. Then, for
the purpose of improving system performance, four requirements
for anti-jamming communications are presented and discussed.
Following the advantages of the Stackelberg game model in anti-
jamming field, we formulate an anti-jamming decision-making
framework based on the Stackelberg game for anti-jamming
defence in wireless networks. Moreover, two preliminary case
studies are presented and discussed for better understanding of
the anti-jamming Stackelberg game problem. Finally, some future
research directions are also provided.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the shared and broadcast nature, the wireless
transmission is highly vulnerable to various attacks, such as
spoofing attack, eavesdropping attack, data falsification attack,
jamming attack, and so on. Therefore, the security issue
becomes a critical attribute of wireless networks, and has
attracted extensive attention in the past decade. In this paper,
we focus on the jamming attack [1]–[3], which is a serious
threat to the security of wireless networks, and deteriorates the
system performance significantly. The anti-jamming problem
is an interesting and challenging topic in wireless transmission,
and also a vital issue for the security of the spectrum avail-
ability. Various countermeasures have been proposed to fight
against jamming attacks, and they can be broadly classified
into two types: spread spectrum based techniques and resource
allocation based techniques [4]. However, spread spectrum
based techniques, such as Frequency Hopping Spread Spec-
trum (FHSS), Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH), and
Random Codekey Selection using Codebook DSSS (RCSC
DSSS) [3], require wide-band spectrum, and therefore, are
regarded to be spectrally inefficient. It is of great importance
to develop anti-jamming schemes that have efficient spectral
efficiency, especially in scarce spectrum scenarios. Thus, it
motivates the optimal resource allocation based techniques
L. Jia, Y. Xu, Y. Sun, and S. Feng are with the College of Com-
munication Engineering, Army Engineering University of PLA, Nanjing
210007, China. (e-mail: jiallts@163.com; yuhuaenator@gmail.com; sunyoum-
ing10@163.com; fengs13@mcmaster.ca).
A. Anpalagan is with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, Ryerson University, Toronto, ON M5B 2K3, Canada (e-
mail:alagan@ee.ryerson.ca).
(i.e., game theory based methods [5]-[13]), which constitute
another family of anti-jamming methods and try to obtain
effective use of resources. Moreover, with the development of
the cognitive radio technology and artificial intelligence, the
jamming attacks with higher-level intelligence pose a great
challenge to the existing defence mechanisms. Therefore, it
is extremely important and timely to develop efficient and
flexible anti-jamming schemes.
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool to adequately
model and analyze the mutual interactions among players.
Among the game theoretical models, Stackelberg game, as
an important hierarchical game, stands out to capture the
sequential interactions among players, and to make a strategic
decision-making in wireless networks. Considering the dif-
ferent attributes and hierarchical behaviors of the legitimate
users and jammers, Stackelberg game is a promising method
to analyze the hierarchical interaction process between the
legitimate users and jammers, and it is, therefore, a suitable
framework for the sequential decision-making of the anti-
jamming defence in wireless networks. The advantages for
exploiting Stackelberg game in anti-jamming field are given
as follows:
• The legitimate users and the jammers belong to different
identities, and they have different attributes. Stackelberg
game can capture the interactions among players with
different attributes. Moreover, the legitimate users need
to detect the jammers’ actions to combat jammers, or the
jammers are able to learn users’ strategies to improve the
jamming efficiency. Thus, the anti-jamming problem con-
tains a natural hierarchical characteristic, and Stackelberg
game is a suitable framework to capture and analyze the
hierarchical interactions between the legitimate users and
jammers.
• The competitive interactions exist between the legiti-
mate users and jammers (upper-level players and lower-
level players), and the mutual competitive interactions
also exist among the legitimate users (the players with
same level) in dense wireless networks. Fortunately, the
Stackelberg game model can simultaneously capture the
competition at different levels.
Stackelberg game model has attracted growing attention in
anti-jamming field recently, and some Stackelberg game solu-
tions have been presented for anti-jamming defence in wireless
communications. In [5]–[9], the Stackelberg game framework
was employed to model and analyze the transmitting-jamming
problem, and the anti-jamming power control game was in-
2vestigated in wireless networks. In [10], the cooperative trans-
mission game was studied, and the equilibrium solution was
obtained. In [11], the authors formulated an attacker-defender
Stackelberg game between a jammer and a target node, and
the timing channel was exploited. In [12], a secure offloading
game was formulated, and the Stackelberg equilibrium was
derived. In [13], we investigated the anti-jamming channel
selection problem in an adversarial environment, and proposed
a hierarchical learning approach to obtain the desirable solu-
tions.
Note that a survey on the jamming and anti-jamming tech-
niques in wireless networks can be found in [2]. It investigated
several types of jammers from the jamming point-of-view and
summarized the existing anti-jamming techniques from the
perspective of the system security. In this paper, however,
we investigate the anti-jamming defence problem in wire-
less networks from a Stackelberg game perspective, and we
mainly focus on exploring and analyzing the inherent features,
fundamental requirements and technical challenges in anti-
jamming communications research. The main contributions of
this article are given as follows:
• We analyze and discuss the fundamental requirements
and technical challenges according to the inherent charac-
teristics of the anti-jamming defence problem in wireless
networks.
• We outline some advantages of the Stackelberg game
for the anti-jamming defence in wireless networks, and
formulate an anti-jamming decision-making framework
based on the Stackelberg game.
• We provide the future research directions of the anti-
jamming defence in wireless networks.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
II, we discuss and analyze the technical challenges and fun-
damental requirements of anti-jamming defence in wireless
networks. In Section III, the Stackelberg game-theoretic model
is investigated, and an anti-jamming decision-making frame-
work based on Stackelberg game is established. In Section IV,
two preliminary case studies are given, and future research
directions are discussed in Section V. Finally, concluding
remarks are presented in Section VI.
II. CHALLENGES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
ANTI-JAMMING COMMUNICATIONS IN WIRELESS
NETWORKS
From the perspective of the engineering, analogous to the
cognition cycle, we formulate an anti-jamming communica-
tions cycle to describe the anti-jamming operations, which
is the backbone for the anti-jamming communications. As
shown in Fig. 1, the anti-jamming communications cycle
mainly consists of the following steps: jamming cognition,
anti-jamming decision-making, and waveform reconfiguration.
Jamming cognition: The anti-jamming communications
cycle begins with the jamming cognition, and the cognitive
radio technologies can be employed to acquire useful informa-
tion. It can perceive the jamming activities and complicated
surrounding environment. Specifically, it should include jam-
mer detection, jammer localization, and so on. For jammer
detection, many techniques have been proposed, such as
machine learning, compressing sensing, and estimation based
detection method. The existing detection approaches were pro-
posed for specific network environment and jamming models.
However, it is a challenging task to differentiate a jamming
scenario for the legitimate users due to the non-cooperative
relationship between the legitimate users and jammers. The
jammer localization is another important aspect, and various
methods were provided, such as range-based methods (e.g.,
Pinpoint, WiSlow, and CrowdLoc) and range-free methods
(e.g., Centriod Localization, Double Circle Localization, and
Triple Circles Localization). Due to the adversarial charac-
teristic and environmental factor, the inaccurate measurement
and data insufficiencies are the main challenges in jammer
localization. Note that the jamming cognition is not limited
to sensing the surrounding environment and obtaining useful
information, it can also realize the high-level intelligence in
the near future, such as knowledge discovery and jamming
prediction.
Anti-jamming decision-making: Based on the jamming
cognition, the anti-jamming decision-making is performed
in adversarial environments, and the optimal anti-jamming
strategy (e.g., transmission power, channel) is chosen. It is
the core technology of the anti-jamming communications,
and a challenging task is to make an effective anti-jamming
decision-making in wireless networks, especially in scarce
resource scenarios and smart jammer scenarios. Due to the
features of the wireless network and adversarial characteristic,
the anti-jamming decision-making problem faces some chal-
lenges, which will be presented later. For the anti-jamming
decision-making, various techniques were proposed in existing
literatures, such as game theory based techniques, multi-
armed bandit based techniques, reinforcement learning based
techniques, and so on. Among these methods, game theory
based techniques, especially the Stackelberg game based tech-
niques, can adequately model the interactions between the
legitimate user and jammer. In this paper, we mainly analyze
the Stackelberg game based anti-jamming methods.
Waveform reconfiguration: The waveform reconfiguration
can be accomplished in multi-domains, such as power do-
main, spectrum domain and space domain, to implement the
anti-jamming communications. It is the physical measure to
achieve the reliable transmission in jammed wireless networks.
In power domain, we can fight against the jamming attack
by adjusting the transmitting power. However, the increase
of the transmitting power may deteriorate the linearity of
power amplifier, and it will affect the performance of some
modulation schemes that are sensitive to the linearity of
power amplifier. In spectrum domain, the channel switching
is adopted to cope with the jamming attack. Note that the
channel switching may bring the performance loss, since the
reconstruction of the communication link needs the settling
time for the radio frequency (RF) devices. Moreover, different
frequencies will have different propagation characteristics, and
it may bring the difference in signal processing.
In this article, we mainly focus on the anti-jamming
decision-making process, which is the critical phase for anti-
jamming communications in wireless networks. In the fol-
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Fig. 1. Anti-jamming communications cycle in wireless networks.
lowing, we aim to explore the inherent features of the anti-
jamming communications, discuss and analyze the technical
challenges and fundamental requirements for anti-jamming
defence in wireless networks. In the following, we mainly
consider the anti-jamming defence problem in power domain
and spectrum domain.
A. Discussion on technical challenges
For anti-jamming communications in wireless networks,
it pursues the reliable transmission in the presence of the
external malicious jammers. In this section, by exploring the
characteristics of wireless networks [14] and specificities in
jammed networks, we discuss the technical challenges of the
anti-jamming problem.
(1) Adversarial: In jammed wireless networks, the legiti-
mate users always aim to maximize their utilities, and pursue
reliable transmission, whereas the malicious jammers try to
purposely deteriorate the intended transmission, and minimize
the utility of the legitimate user. Therefore, the legitimate
users and jammers work in an adversarial and non-cooperative
environment.
Different from the general wireless networks, the adver-
sarial characteristic is an important challenge in jammed
networks. It is difficult to acquire the complete informa-
tion of the opponent due to the adversarial characteristic,
and the incomplete information constraints are common in
anti-jamming decision-making. To cope with the incomplete
information constraints, the Bayesian game framework and
learning technologies (i.e., stochastic learning automata) are
effective methods. In a Bayesian game framework, the utility
function is defined over statistics, such as taking expectation,
to describe the incomplete information constraints, and only
the distribution information is needed. The learning technology
is another candidate to deal with the incomplete information
constraints. It can obtain the desirable solutions by trial-and-
error exploration and learning from historical information.
(2) Incomplete: Due to the adversarial feature between the
legitimate users and jammers, it is difficult to acquire complete
information of the opponents. Furthermore, considering the
limitation of the hardware and resource consumption, only
partial information of the environment is available for both the
users and jammers. Various forms of incomplete information
constraints can be present, such as incomplete information of
the channel gain [8] and the user type [15].
(3) Uncertain: Due to the limitation of the capability of
the signal processing and hardware facilities, it is difficult to
observe the perfect information, and the observation error is
common in anti-jamming field.
(4) Dynamic: The environmental information is variable
over the course of time. For example, the channel state
information is dynamic, and the traffic demands are time-
varying due to their specific requirements. Furthermore, the
position of the jammers may be random as well.
(5) Dense: In the coming future, dense networks are com-
mon, such as small cell networks and D2D networks. It will
be challenging and interesting to investigate the anti-jamming
problem in dense wireless networks, where both the mutual
interference among users and external malicious jamming
need to be simultaneously considered. Specifically, external
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the wireless networks
jamming is a crucial factor that leads to the performance degra-
dation, and the mutual interference among users is another
factor that significantly restricts the network performance.
For the anti-jamming problem in dense networks, firstly,
it is of paramount importance to fight against the external
malicious jamming. Secondly, it is essential to consider the
interference mitigation problem. In our prior work [13], a
preliminary anti-jamming scheme in dense wireless networks
had been investigated, and a hierarchical learning framework
was formulated. It is noted that the hypergraph model is a
good candidate to explicitly describe the interference relation.
As can be seen from Fig. 2(a), the hypergraph interference
model can adequately capture the strong interference relation
and cumulative weak interference relation. The dash lines in
Fig. 2(a) represent the strong interference relation, and the
circles denote the cumulative weak interference relation. It will
be promising to incorporate hypergraph interference model
into the anti-jamming game in dense wireless networks.
(6) Heterogeneous: In future wireless networks, as indi-
cated in Fig. 2(b), different types of devices will co-exist in
a region, such as communication devices, navigation devices,
radar devices, and so on. It will lead to a severe conflict and
complicated environment. The intra-system interference, inter-
system interference, and external malicious jamming need to
be jointly considered.
In heterogeneous wireless networks, there exist diverse de-
vices. Meanwhile, different devices belong to different systems
(e.g., communication, navigation, and radar), and have differ-
ent service demands (e.g., voice, image, and data). Different
systems and services may have different anti-jamming require-
ments. Moreover, due to the dense deployment of diverse
devices, the severe intra-system interference and inter-system
interference bring new challenges. Therefore, it will be ex-
tremely challenging to investigate the anti-jamming problem in
heterogeneous wireless networks, and we need to jointly cope
with the intra-system interference, inter-system interference,
and external malicious jamming.
B. Discussion on fundamental requirements
Considering the inherent characteristics, we list some fun-
damental requirements of the anti-jamming defence problem
in wireless communications, which mainly include reliability,
robustness, scalability, and heterogeneity.
Firstly, it is necessary to obtain reliable transmission in wire-
less networks, and design effective anti-jamming approaches,
especially in scarce resource scenarios and smart jammer
scenarios.
Secondly, it should be robust to cope with different kinds
of dynamics and uncertain factors in anti-jamming field. As
discussed before, the channel state information is partially
available. Moreover, the traffic demands may be variable.
Thirdly, as stated before, the user devices will be densely
deployed in future wireless networks, and both mutual inter-
ference and external jamming will affect system performance.
Therefore, the designed anti-jamming defence schemes should
have the ability to be extended to dense scenarios, and address
the mutual interference among users and malicious jamming
simultaneously.
Finally, various heterogeneous devices will coexist in future
wireless networks. It brings new challenges to the traditional
anti-jamming solutions in homogeneous networks, and they
cannot be directly employed. Therefore, it is essential to de-
velop novel anti-jamming schemes in heterogeneous wireless
networks.
III. ANTI-JAMMING STACKELBERG GAME IN WIRELESS
NETWORKS
The Stackelberg game is regarded as an extension of the
non-cooperative game, and it is a powerful mathematical tool
that can be used to model the hierarchical interactions among
players in a sequential manner. In a Stackelberg game, there
are two types of players: leaders and followers. The leaders
have the privilege over the followers and take actions first.
Then, the followers make decisions based on the leaders’
announced strategy. For a Stackelberg game model, the leaders
and followers have their respective utility functions, and the
most common solution is the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE),
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Fig. 3. The proposed anti-jamming decision-making framework in wireless
networks.
which means no player can achieve higher utility by deviating
unilaterally.
Stackelberg game model has been extensively applied to
wireless networks recently, and it has been a powerful tool to
make the hierarchical decision-making in wireless networks,
such as offloading mechanism, enhancing secrecy rate, dy-
namic spectrum access in heterogeneous networks, wireless
service provider selection, and power control in femtocell
networks. In anti-jamming field, it is an appealing tool to
adequately model and analyze the hierarchical interactions
between the legitimate users and external jammers, and make
a strategic decision-making in an adversarial environment.
To deal with the technical challenges of the anti-jamming
issue in wireless networks, an anti-jamming decision-making
framework based on Stackelberg game is formulated to combat
the jammers. As shown in Fig. 3, it mainly consists of two
steps:
• Stackelberg game formulation and analysis.
• Design of algorithms for anti-jamming decision-making.
Stackelberg game formulation and analysis: Firstly, it is
necessary to recognize the identities and their available actions
of the players, and design proper utility functions accordingly.
Secondly, for an anti-jamming Stackelberg game, we need
to answer who act as the leaders and who are followers,
the answer for which is that it depends on specific research
scenarios. For example, in [5], [6], [8], and [9], it is assumed
that the jammer is able to learn the legitimate user’s strategies,
and the legitimate user take actions first. The legitimate user
is the leader, and the jammer is assumed to be the follower.
In [7], two scenarios (jammer as the leader and user as the
leader) are both considered. In [13], the users need to detect
the jammer’s actions before the channel selection, and it is
assumed that the jammer acts as the leader and the users
are followers. Since the utility function has a great impact
on the performance of the game model, it is thus important
to define proper utility functions. For example, the player
can obtain the unique optimal strategy for the power control
problem if the utility function is convex [8]. For the channel
selection problem, the properties of the game model depend
on the utility function, such as the exact potential game,
which satisfies that the variation of the potential function
is the same as the variation of the utility function by any
player’s unilateral deviation. The exact potential game has
several attractive properties (i.e., admitting at least one pure
strategy Nash equilibrium), and it can be incorporated into the
follower sub-game [13].
Mathematically, an anti-jamming Stackelberg game can be
formulated as G = {N u,Nj ,Su,Sj , µs, µj}, where N u and
Nj , Su and Sj , µs and µj are player set, strategy space,
and utility function of the legitimate users and jammers,
respectively. In a Stackelberg game model, there exists a
hierarchical competition between the upper-level players (lead-
ers) and lower-level players (followers). Moreover, the mutual
competition also takes place among the players within the
same level. Fortunately, the Stackelberg game can adequately
model and analyze the competition at different levels.
The Bayesian Stackelberg game is a good framework to
cope with the uncertainties due to the uncertain and incomplete
constraints. For the dense deployment scenario, Stackelberg
game is a suitable tool, which can analyze the mutual compe-
tition among legitimate users and the competition between the
legitimate users and external jammers simultaneously. For a
future heterogeneous network, intra-system interference, inter-
system interference, and external malicious jamming co-exist,
and the multi-level Stackelberg game may be a good candi-
date for the anti-jamming problem in heterogeneous wireless
networks.
Design of algorithms for anti-jamming decision-making:
For the anti-jamming Stackelberg game problem, it is also a
hierarchical optimization problem, and can be transformed into
sequential sub-problems. To achieve this, a backward induction
method is a common approach, and it has been employed to
analyze the Stackelberg game and obtain the game-theoretic
solutions. The follower sub-game is firstly investigated. Then,
the leader sub-game is considered.
For the continuous problem, such as the continuous power
control [5]–[8], [10], the SE solution is obtained based on
the convex optimization techniques, such as Lagrange duality
optimization theory, and Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions. However, for the discrete problem, such as the anti-
jamming channel selection problem [13], it is intractable to
adopt the traditional convex optimization techniques, and we
need a new optimization framework and thus resort to learning
theory, which achieves the desirable solutions through repeated
trial-and-error exploration with a random environment. Some
learning algorithms can be found in previous works, such as
reinforcement learning, stochastic learning automata, and spa-
tial adaptive play [14]. The learning technology can cope with
uncertain, dynamic, and incomplete information constraints,
whereas game theory can adequately model and analyze the
mutual interactions among users. Therefore, it is promising
to incorporate the learning technologies into game theory.
However, when the learning algorithms are incorporated into
game theory, the challenge is to prove the convergence of the
learning algorithms, which is application-dependent and will
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Fig. 4. The implementation process of the anti-jamming Stackelberg game.
significantly differ for various applications.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In this section, we present two case studies of anti-jamming
Stackelberg game approaches to motivate the readers and
appreciate the practicality of such approaches.
A. Power control game with incomplete information
Most existing anti-jamming Stackelberg power game ap-
proaches studied the scenarios with complete information.
However, the scenarios with incomplete information are more
general and practical in anti-jamming field. In [8], we inves-
tigated the anti-jamming power control problem with incom-
plete information constraints in wireless communications. A
system model with one user (transmitter-receiver pair) and one
jammer is considered, and a Bayesian anti-jamming Stackel-
berg game is proposed, which can cope with the adversarial
characteristic, incomplete information constraints. To capture
the incomplete information constraints, the utility function is
defined over statistics, such as taking expectation. Based on
the duality optimization theory, the SE solution is derived.
Moreover, the impact of the jammer’s observation error ε
is analyzed. The utility function of the user is defined as
the signal to interference plus noise ratio considering the
transmission cost. The jammer’s utility function is also defined
as a function of the signal to interference plus noise ratio and
the transmission cost. In the considered scenario, the user aims
to maximize its utility, and takes actions first. The jammer
can learn the user’s transmission strategies, and play its best
response strategy based on the user’s announced strategy. The
SE solution is obtained by the backward induction method,
and the follower sub-game is investigated at first. To better
understand the process of the power control game, a flow chart
is shown in Fig. 4(a). In this section, the transmission rate can
be defined as:
R = log(1 + δ), (1)
where δ denotes the signal to interference plus noise ratio.
In Fig. 5, we show the performance comparison of the
transmission rate for different solutions. To evaluate the per-
formance, we compare the proposed Bayesian anti-jamming
Stackelberg game with the average game, which is a modified
game in [5] and only concerns the average value of the
incomplete information, e.g., channel state information and
transmission cost. It can be seen that the transmission rate of
the proposed game is better than the average game. In addition,
the observation error ε results in the increase of the user’s
transmission rate.
B. Anti-jamming channel selection game in dense wireless
networks
In this section, we investigate the anti-jamming channel
selection problem in the dense wireless networks with time-
varying radio environment, where the mutual co-channel in-
terference among users and external malicious jamming ex-
ist simultaneously. On the one hand, the external malicious
jamming is a significant factor to deteriorate the system
performance of the wireless networks. One the other hand, the
mutual co-channel interference also significantly degrades the
system performance. In [13], a system with N users and one
jammer is considered, and a single leader and multi-follower
Stackelberg game is formulated. To obtain the desirable so-
lutions, we propose a hierarchical learning algorithm (HLA),
which can cope with the uncertain, dynamic and incomplete
constraints. The implementation process is shown in Fig. 4(b).
To be specific, for the jammer, based on Q-learning, a channel
selection algorithm is proposed, and the jammer’s strategies
7are updated at each epoch k. For users, a channel selection
algorithm based on stochastic learning automata (SLA) is
proposed, and the users’ strategies update at each time slot t.
It is noted that each epoch contains K time slots. The metric
is the expected weighted aggregate interference and jamming
(EWAIJ), and it is defined as:
U =
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈{N/{n}}
PnPmH¯
an
mnf(am, an)
+
∑
n∈N
PnPjH¯
cj
jnf(cj, an),
(2)
where an denotes the channel selection of user n, cj denotes
the jamming channel, N is the user set, H¯anmn represents
the expected interference gain from user m to user n, H¯
cj
jn
denotes the expected jamming gain from the jammer to user
n, f(am, an) denotes an indicator function (f(am, an) = 1
for am = an, and f(am, an) = 0 for am 6= an), Pm and Pj
represents the transmission power of user n and the jammer,
respectively. The rate of user n can be given by:
Rn = B log
(
1 +
PnH
an
nn
BN0 + In + Jn
)
, (3)
where B denotes the bandwidth, N0 is the noise power spec-
trum density, In and Jn represent the co-channel interference
and malicious jamming, respectively.
The utility of user n is defined as un(an, a−n, cj) =
L−
∑
m∈{N/{n}} PnPmH¯
an
mnf(am, an)−PnPjH¯
cj
jnf(cj , an),
where L represents a predefined positive constant. Each
user aims to maximize its utility. The jammer’s utility is
uj (a, cj) =
∑
n∈N PnPjH¯
cj
jnf(cj , an), and it aims at maxi-
mizing its damage. Our objective is to find a channel selection
profile that can minimize EWAIJ, which denotes the received
mutual interference and external malicious jamming.
In Fig. 6, the performance comparison is presented. To show
the performance, we compare the proposed HLA algorithm
with the random selection scheme, in which the user randomly
selects one channel at each time. As indicated in Fig. 6(a), the
proposed HLA algorithm outperforms the random selection
scheme, and higher transmitting power Pi of legitimate users
results in the increase of the EWAIJ performance. Moreover,
the EWAIJ increases with the growing number of users. The
reason is that growing number of users leads to more serious
mutual interference. As can be seen from Fig. 6(b), as the
number of users increases, the expected achievable rate of each
user decreases. The reason is that increasing number of users
brings heavy mutual interference. It is noted that the expected
achievable rate grows with increasing transmitting power of
users at first. Then, if the number of users is large enough, the
curve would reach a steady level or even go downwards with
higher transmitting power of users. The reason is that higher
transmitting power of legitimate users yields more serious
mutual interference. As shown in Fig. 6(c), the proposed
HLA is superior to the random selection scheme and yields
higher expected achievable rate. Specifically, when N = 4
and Pj = 15W , the expected achievable rate of the proposed
HLA is improved by approximately 30% compared to the
random selection scheme. It is also noted that the performance
gap between the proposed HLA and random selection scheme
decreases with the increasing number of users. The reason is
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Fig. 5. The performance comparison of different solutions.
that when the number of users N becomes sufficiently large,
the channels are very crowded, and users can uniformly be
spread over the channels. In addition, it can be seen from
Fig. 6(c) that the expected achievable rate will decrease with
the growing transmitting power of the jammer. The reason is
that higher transmitting power of the jammer leads to more
serious damage.
V. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Although the study to the anti-jamming schemes based on
Stackelberg game is now in infancy, it will definitely attract
great interest and attention in the near future. Based on the
previous discussions, we give some future research directions
in the following.
• To improve the jamming efficiency and decrease the
probability of detection, the position of the jammer may
be mobile in practical scenarios. Therefore, it is interest-
ing to investigate the anti-jamming problems in mobile
scenarios.
• In realistic scenarios, the players’ utility functions are
not deterministic and random due to variable channel
state information, noise, feedback errors, and observation
error. It is, therefore, interesting to study the anti-jamming
problem with estimation error. For this scenario, a noisy
stochastic game can be formulated, and efficient estima-
tion samples can be used to improve the anti-jamming
performance.
• In dense wireless networks, we need to jointly consider
mutual interference among legitimate users and external
malicious jamming. Moreover, various traffic demands
and priorities also need to be investigated. Specifically,
different traffic demands will lead to variable set of active
users, and it results in variable set of players. Thus,
a dynamic game model with dynamic traffic demands
is needed. Different priorities represent the degree of
importance, and the users with higher priority should be
satisfied with their requirements at first. Consequently,
it is promising to investigate the anti-jamming schemes
81 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
Transmitting power of users (W)
E
W
A
IJ
 (
U
)
Proposed HLA,N=5
Proposed HLA,N=6
Proposed HLA,N=7
Proposed HLA,N=8
Proposed HLA,N=9
Random selection,N=7
(a) Comparison results of the EWAIJ (Pj = 25W ).
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Transmitting power of users (W)
E
x
p
ec
te
d
 a
ch
ie
v
ab
le
 r
at
e 
(M
b
p
s)
Proposed HLA,N=5
Proposed HLA,N=6
Proposed HLA,N=7
Proposed HLA,N=8
Proposed HLA,N=9
Random selection,N=7
(b) Comparison results of the expected achievable
rate (Pj = 25W ).
4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Number of users (N)
E
x
p
ec
te
d
 a
ch
ie
v
ab
le
 r
at
e 
(M
b
p
s)
Proposed HLA,P
j
=25W
Proposed HLA,P
j
=15W
Random selection,P
j
=25W
Random selection,P
j
=15W
(c) Comparison results of the expected achievable
rate for different solutions (Pn = 4W ).
Fig. 6. The performance comparison.
with dynamic traffic demands and different priorities in
wireless networks.
• Considering the heterogeneity in future wireless net-
works, the user devices may have various service de-
mands and different anti-jamming requirements. More-
over, in a heterogeneous wireless network, intra-system
interference, inter-system interference, and external mali-
cious jamming co-exist, and therefore, constitute a com-
plicated environment. Thus, it is a challenging task to
design the anti-jamming approaches in heterogeneous
wireless networks.
• According to the history observations of the external
jammers, we can predict the action of the jammers, and
further enhance the anti-jamming performance. There-
fore, it is an interesting topic to design effective anti-
jamming schemes with jamming prediction ability in
future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we investigated the anti-jamming defence
problem in wireless communications, which is an important
topic in wireless transmission, and also a vital problem for
the security of the spectrum availability. First, we presented
the technical challenges and fundamental requirements of anti-
jamming defence problem in wireless networks. Then, follow-
ing the advantages of the Stackelberg game model in anti-
jamming field, an anti-jamming decision-making framework
based on Stackelberg game was established. We provided two
case studies to analyze the anti-jamming Stackelberg game.
Finally, we gave some future research directions.
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